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NOTES
Oregon v. Bradshaw: Waiver Standard
Emasculated
INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic that an accused is entitled to certain protections
once he is taken into custody and subjected to our system of crimi-
nal justice.1 From the moment initial interrogation begins, the
United States Constitution provides an individual with the right to
be free from compelled self-incrimination 2 and with the right to the
assistance of counsel in order to preserve that right.3 Of course, an
individual is free to waive these rights and proceed without the
assistance of counsel.4 However, in light of the serious ramifica-
tions a waiver of the right to counsel can have on an individual's
defense, the United States Supreme Court has cloaked the accused
with additional safeguards to protect against involuntary waivers
made without the assistance of counsel.5 Paramount among these is
1. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966), the Court stated: "there can
be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court
proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action
is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves."
Thus, in Miranda the Court invoked the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and extended an accused's right to the presence of an attorney to the preindict-
ment stage. This filled in the gap left by the decision in Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964), which held that once criminal proceedings have begun, an accused's
sixth amendment right to counsel protected him against statements surreptitiously elic-
ited from him by government agents while the defendant was free on bail. See also
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), where the Court reaffirmed an arrestee's
precharge fifth amendment right to counsel while distinguishing between the right to
remain silent and the right to counsel. Cf. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369
(1979). In Butler, while conceding that an accused is entitled to the fifth amendment
right to counsel once in custody, the Court held that an express waiver is not an abso-
lute prerequisite to the finding of a waiver of this right; see also Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981) and Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
2. The fifth amendment to the Constitution states in part: "No person shall be
. . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 469 "the right to have counsel present at the
interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege
4. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S.
369 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708
(1948); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
5. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464; see also Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. at 723, where
the Court states that the duty to protect against involuntary waivers "imposes the seri-
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the right of an accused in custody to cut off questioning until an
attorney is present. 6 In Edwards v. Arizona,7 the Supreme Court
further strengthened the accused's shield against involuntary and
uncounseled confessions. Under Edwards, once an accused invokes
his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, 8 police may not
question him again, and a valid waiver of that right cannot be
found, unless the accused himself initiates conversation with the au-
thorities.9 In Oregon v. Bradshaw,10 the Court attempted to clarify
the concept of initiation of conversation, holding that an accused
must, in his statement, evince a willingness to discuss the interroga-
tion.'l However, what the Supreme Court gave with its right hand
when it enunciated this standard, the Court took away with its left
when it applied it.12
This Note will first trace the development of the standard for
waiving one's right to counsel and present a brief review of the
Court's strict adherence to this standard. Following this is an anal-
ysis of Edwards v. Arizona'3 and the requirement that an accused
initiate conversation with the authorities before a waiver of the right
to counsel can be found. Under Edwards, a response to a subse-
quent interrogation, regardless of its voluntariness, is inadmissable
absent such initiation.' 4 This Note will then focus on Oregon v.
Bradshaw,15 and examine the consequences of the Court's attempt
in Bradshaw to define initiation of conversation.
ous and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an
intelligent and competent waiver by the accused." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. at 465). The above standard for a waiver of a constitutional right has been reaf-
firmed by a plethora of United States Supreme Court cases to date. See Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
6. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.
7. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
8. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 298 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
at 444) (emphasis added by the Court) "'by custodial interrogation, we mean question-
ing initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'" However, interro-
gation refers not only to express questioning but also to its functional equivalent, that is,
"any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incrim-
inating response from the suspect." Id. at 301 (footnotes omitted).
9. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 485.
10. 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983).
11. Id. at 2835.
12. Although the Court in Bradshaw announced a fairly specific standard, the
Court applied this standard too loosely. Thus, a waiver is more easily found and the
protections erected around the fifth amendment right to counsel are diluted.
13. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
14. Id. at 485-87.
15. 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983).
2
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 3, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss3/3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
I. PRIOR LAW
The standard for determining whether one has waived a constitu-
tional right was first enununciated in Johnson v. Zerbst'6 where Jus-
tice Black, writing for the majority, stated: "'[C]ourts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental con-
stitutional rights, and. . . we 'do not presume acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights.' A waiver is ordinarily an intelligent
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."1 7
The Court then formulated the test to determine whether a waiver
has in fact been made. It is to be judged by the totality of circum-
stances, "including the background, experience and conduct of the
accused."1 8 Although forty-five years old, the Zerbst totality of
cicumstances test continues to be endorsed by the Court.' 9
Only a decade later in Von Moltke v. Gillies,20 a four judge plural-
ity emphasized that the inquiry into whether a waiver has been
made entails a "penetrating and comprehensive examination of all
the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered."' 21 This
strong presumption against a waiver was reaffirmed again in
Carnley v. Cochran22 in which the Court refused to make the waiver
issue depend on whether an accused affirmatively requested
counsel. 23
In Miranda v. Arizona,24 the significance of an accused's fifth
amendment right to counsel25 made applicable to the states via the
16. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In Zerbst, both defendants were arraigned, tried, con-
victed, and sentenced for feloniously uttering and possessing counterfeit money. Both
were tried without counsel having been made available.
17. Id. at 464 (footnotes and citation omitted).
18. Id.
19. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
20. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
21. Id. at 724. In Gilies, the accused signed a waiver form expressly waiving her
right to counsel and subsequently pleaded guilty. The defendant later alleged that she
neither understandingly waived the benefit of the advice of counsel nor was provided
with the assistance of counsel as required by the sixth amendment. The Court stated
that "to be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the
charges, .. and all other facts essential to the broad understanding of the whole mat-
ter." Id.
22. 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
23. In Cochran, the defendant, an illiterate, was tried without counsel and was
convicted of serious noncapital offenses. The Court held that the deprivation of the
assistance of counsel violated defendant's fourteenth amendment due process rights.
The Court stated: "where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the
right to be furnished with counsel does not depend on a request. . . . Presuming
waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be
an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelli-
gently and understandably rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver." 369 U.S. at
513, 517.
24. 384 U.S. 435 (1966).
25. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1983) and its progeny dealt with violations of
the sixth amendment right to counsel stemming from the denial of the assistance of
3
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due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution, was once again acknowledged and the duty to
scrupulously honor this right was again mandated. 26 The Court ex-
amined a number of psychological ploys used by police interro-
gators to elicit incriminating statements from suspects during
custodial interrogation. 27 Based on this inquiry, the Court con-
cluded that the period between arrest and trial is a most crucial one
and that the presence or absence of counsel during these intervals
can be determinative at trial.28
The Supreme Court in Miranda then proceeded to outline the
proof necessary to establish a waiver of a suspect's right to counsel
during custodial interrogation. If a suspect makes a statement in
the absence of counsel "a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
...his right to retained or appointed counsel."' 29 More specifi-
counsel once criminal proceedings had begun. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and its progeny address the implications of the fifth amendment right to counsel
as it relates to the privilege against self-incrimination resulting from a denial of counsel
in a custodial setting often before criminal proceedings have begun. The difference be-
tween the protections afforded by each constitutional amendment is the point at which
the protections of each amendment attach. Significant here is that regardless upon
which amendment a claim is founded, the standard for a waiver of the constitutional
right involved is the same: that of a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver.
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467; "the accused must be adequately and
effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of these rights must be fully honored."
27. The Court first stated that since interrogation takes place in privacy, a gap is
left in our knowledge as to what really goes on in the interrogation rooms. The Court
examined various police manuals and texts which documented successful procedures
used in the past and which recommended procedures for the future. Based on this
inquiry the Court drew the following picture of a custodial interrogation.
To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to de-
prive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt under-
mines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police
seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless ques-
tioning, are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must "pa-
tiently maneuver himself on her quarry into a position from which the desired
objective may be obtained." When normal procedures fail to produce the
needed result, the police may resort to deceptive strategems such as giving
false legal advice. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for example,
by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police
then persuade, trick or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights.
384 U.S. at 449.
28. Id. at 455, 467.
[T]he very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual
liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals. . . . [WVlithout proper safe-
guards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused
of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely.
In order to combat this inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation the
holding in Miranda requires that a suspect or accused be apprised, at the inception of
police custody, of the right to have counsel present before or during any interrogation.
29. Id. at 475.
4
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cally, the Court stated that an express statement by an accused that
he is willing to talk without an attorney present may constitute a
waiver, if followed by a statement. 30 However, the Court empha-
sized that "a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the
silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the
fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained. '31
Most recently, the Court has reiterated that the presence of a
waiver of the right to counsel is predicated on a knowing relinquish-
ment rather than a mere showing of voluntariness. In Brewer v.
Williams 3 2 the Court stated that, "it is true that Williams [the de-
fendant] had been informed of and appeared to understand his right
to counsel. But waiver requires not merely comprehension but re-
linquishment, and Williams' consistent reliance upon the advice of
counsel in dealing with the authorities refutes any suggestion that
he waived such right."'33
Proving that an accused has waived his right to counsel entails
more than the mere showing that an accused understands he has a
right to counsel. A knowing and intentional decision to forego the
assistance of an attorney must be shown if the parameters of the
waiver standard are not to be exceeded. However the waiver need
not be express. "The question [of whether one has decided to pro-
ceed without counsel] is not one of form, but rather whether the
defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights...
mere silence is not enough. . . . The courts must presume that a




32. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). In Brewer, the defendant Williams was suspected of ab-
ducting a ten.year old girl in Des Moines, Iowa. The suspect surrendered himself to
authorities in Davenport. Both his Des Moines lawyer and his lawyer at the Davenport
arraignment advised the defendant not to make any statements until returning to Des
Moines and consulting with his attorney. The police officers who were to accompany
Williams on the drive back to Des Moines agreed not to question him during the trip.
However, one of the police who knew that the defendant was a former mental patient
and deeply religious, delivered what has become known as the "Christian burial"
speech. The officer told Williams that he felt they should stop and locate the girl's body
immediately in order to ensure her parents an opportunity to give their daughter a
decent Christian burial. Williams eventually made incriminating statements in the
course of the drive and finally directed the officers to the body. In response to a sup-
pression motion for the incriminating evidence obtained during the trip, the prosecution
sought to establish that the defendant had waived his right to counsel by voluntarily
cooperating with the police officers. Id. at 391-41.
33. Id. at 404.
34. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). In Butler, the defendant
was arrested, advised of his Miranda rights, and presented with a waiver form. Butler
agreed to talk but refused to sign the waiver form. His statements to police were subse-
quently used against him at trial and he was convicted. The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed the conviction holding that defendant's refusal to sign the waiver form
[Vol. 21
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The preceding analysis is set forth in order to emphasize the
heavy burden of proof that the Supreme Court has consistently im-
posed on the prosecution in establishing a waiver of one's right to
counsel, whether it be pursuant to the fifth amendment or the sixth
amendment. 35 To follow is an analysis of Edwards v. Arizona 36 in
which the Court further developed the waiver doctrine, thereby
strengthening a suspect's shield against interrogations conducted
without the presence of an attorney. The knowing and voluntary
relinquishment principle was reaffirmed in Edwards,37 but the
Court added a new component to the waiver standard. The addi-
tional element is the necessary fimding that an accused, having once
invoked his right to counsel, initiated further conversation with the
police.38
A. Edwards v. Arizona: Suspect's Shield Strengthened
On January 19, 1976, Edwards was arrested pursuant to a sworn
complaint charging him with robbery, burglary, and first degree
murder. While en route to the station the officers read him his
rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona.39 At the station the police
read him those same rights again.4° Edwards was questioned until
he invoked his right to counsel. At this point questioning ceased.41
The next morning two detectives went to the jail and asked to see
Edwards. When the detention officer informed Edwards that the
detectives wished to speak with him, Edwards replied that he did
not want to talk to anyone. The officer told Edwards "he had" to
talk to him, and again informed Edwards of his Miranda rights.42
precluded a finding that Butler had waived his fifth amendment right to the presence of
counsel during custodial interrogation. The United States Supreme Court reversed the
holding of the North Carolina Supreme Court and emphasized that an express waiver is
not indispensable to the finding of a waiver of the right to counsel.
35. See supra notes 1 and 25.
36. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
37. Id. at 482.
38. Id. at 485. Under Edwards once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, he must
affirmatively reopen dialogue with authorities in order to waive this right.
39. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
40. 451 U.S. at 478.
41. Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, "If the individual states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the
individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him pres-
ent during any subsequent questioning." 384 U.S. at 474.
42. 451 U.S. at 479. The fact that Edwards was read his Miranda rights on several
occasions was of no value to the government because Edwards had invoked his right to
counsel as distinguished from his right to remain silent. In Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96 (1975), the Court noted that Miranda had "distinguished between the proce-
dural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an attorney"
and directed that "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present only if the
individual states that he wants an attorney." Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
at 474). The Court in Mosley held that reinterrogation may occur under certain circum-
1985]
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Edwards was willing to make a statement as long as it was not tape
recorded. The detectives told Edwards that it did not matter
whether his statement was recorded or not since they could testify
in court as to any statement made. Edwards replied, "I'll tell you
anything you want to know, but I don't want it on tape."'43 Shortly
thereafter, Edward confessed.
Subsequently, Edwards made a pretrial motion to suppress the
confession he had made during the second interrogation. 44 The
trial court granted the motion to suppress holding that Edwards
had invoked his right to the assistance of counsel prior to making
any statement and that the police failed to scrupulously honor45 the
accused's assertion of his rights by requestioning him in the absence
of counsel. 46 This finding was reversed the following day, however,
when the court was presented with a supposedly controlling deci-
sion of a higher Arizona court.47 The trial court then held that
Edwards' statements to the detectives were voluntary, and that the
officer's testimony as to those statements was credible.4 8 Following
a mistrial49 Edwards was again tried and finally convicted. Evi-
dence concerning his confession was admitted at both trials.
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Edwards did
invoke his right to counsel during the initial interrogation5 ° and
stances upon the invocation of the right to remain silent. The Court focused on the
lapse of time between the two interrogation sessions involved and the failure of defen-
dant to reassert his right to remain silent after being re-Mirandized. Had he reasserted
his desire to be silent the police would have had to honor that reassertion.
By contrast, once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, failure to do so again at a
subsequent interrogation without counsel is not fatal as to the initial invocation. An
invocation of the right to counsel is therefore to be interpreted as a request for counsel
and as a request to remain silent until and only until counsel is present. See also Fare v.
Michael, 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) where the Court refers to Miranda's "rigid rule that
an accused's request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment
rights, requiring that all interrogation cease." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298
(1980), where the Court alluded to the "undisputed right" under Miranda that one in
custody is to be free from interrogation "until he had consulted with a lawyer."
43. 451 U.S. at 479.
44. Edwards was arrested on January 19, 1976. During questioning on January 19.
he invoked his right to counsel. The second interrogation, during which he made his
confession, was on the morning of January 20, 1976.
45. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474, the Court stated: "If the individual
cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police,
they must respect his decision to remain silent." Police officers failed to scrupulously
honor Edward's fifth amendment right to counsel by returning to his cell, after he had
invoked his right to counsel. Edwards, 431 U.S. at 479. See supra note 42.
46. State v. Edwards, 122 Ariz. 206, 209, 594 P.2d 72, 75 (1979).
47. The case brought to the attention of the court was State v. Travis, 26 Ariz.
App. 24, 545 P.2d 986 (1976).
48. State v. Edwards, 122 Ariz. at 212, 594 P.2d at 76.
49. The jury in the first trial was unable to reach a verdict.
50. At the police station, on January 19, 1976, Edwards was informed of his Mi-
randa rights, and questioned. He denied involvement and presented an alibi defense.
Edwards then sought to make a deal. The interrogating officer gave Edwards the
7
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then focused on whether Edwards subsequently waived that right.51
The court determined that Edwards had waived both rights during
the January 20 meeting when, after having again been informed of
his rights to remain silent and have counsel present, he voluntarily
made a statement to the detectives.52
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Jus-
tice White, reversed Edwards' conviction on the ground that his
fifth and fourteenth amendment rights, as construed in Miranda v.
Arizona,5 3 were violated. The Court held that the Arizona Supreme
Court focused only on the voluntariness of the consent 4 and failed
to properly inquire into "whether Edwards understood his right to
counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it."' 5s The
Supreme Court reemphasized the long accepted standard of
waiver 56 and concluded that once a suspect invokes his right to
counsel "additional safeguards" are necessary to ensure that this
invocation is honored by the authorities.5 7 The Court stated:
we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of
that right cannot be established by showing only that he re-
sponded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if
number of a county attorney, Edwards made the call, but hung up after a few moments.
Edwards then asked the interrogating officer for an attorney before making a deal. 122
Arizona at 209, 594 P.2d at 75. The court stated that although equivocal, the statement
was "sufficiently clear" within the context of the interrogation that it "must be inter-
preted as a request for counsel and as a request to remain silent until counsel was
present." 122 Ariz. at 211, 594 P.2d at 77.
The manner in which the Arizona court interpreted Edwards' invocation of his right
to counsel is significant. Although ambiguous, the invocation was interpreted in favor
of the defendant. Due to the importance of a suspect's constitutional right to the pres-
ence of an attorney these ambiguities should be interpreted as such. A contrary inter-
pretation can deprive a suspect of a crucial constitutional right at a most crucial
interval. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983), and infra notes 89-98 and
accompanying text.
51. 122 Ariz. at 212, 594 P.2d at 78. The Arizona Supreme Court cited
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), which dealt with the voluntariness of
a consent to search. The Court focused its review of the lower court's opinion on
whether Edwards' confession was voluntary.
There exists no dispute that voluntariness is indeed at issue in the waiver inquiry;
however, in and of itself it is not conclusive. A waiver must be a knowing, voluntary
and intelligent relinquishment.
52. 122 Ariz. at 212, 594 P.2d at 78.
53. 384 U.S. 436. See supra note 45.
54. See supra note 51.
55. 451 U.S. at 484; "the voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one
hand, and a knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries .... It
is thus apparent that the decision below misunderstood the requirement for finding a
valid waiver of the right to counsel, once invoked."
56. Id. at 482.
57. Id. at 484. Although an accused can be requestioned under certain circum-
stances after invoking his or her right to remain silent, a waiver of the right to counsel
demands "additional safeguards" which come into play upon the accused's request to
have counsel present. See supra note 42.
1985]
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he has [again] been advised of his rights. We further hold that an
accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further com-
munication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.58
The Supreme Court then held that since Edwards had not requested
the detectives' return on January 20, he had not initiated conversa-
tion with the police, and therefore could not have waived his right
to counsel.5 9
The Supreme Court thus inserted a new and indispensable ele-
ment60 into the finding of a valid waiver of counsel, once invoked by
an accused. The import of the decision is that once an accused is
taken into custody and invokes his right to counsel, 61 the inquiry
into whether a waiver of that right was subsequently made involves
a two-step process. First, the accused must be found to have initi-
ated conversation with the police, and second, it must be found that
under the totality of circumstances the accused knowingly, volunta-
rily and intelligently waived his right to counsel.62 The critical
point in the two step process is that the need for the second inquiry
is contingent upon an affirmative finding of the first.63 Absent a
finding that the accused initiated the conversation under Edwards
there must not be an inquiry into the totality of circumstances sur-
rounding the accused's statements." Most importantly, absent a
finding that the accused, and not the police, re-opened the conversa-
tion, the number of times the Miranda warning is administered is
irrelevant.
65
In order to give effect to the holding of Edwards v. Arizona and
the "additional safeguards" 66 intended by the majority of the Court,
the issue of what constitutes initiation of conversation is para-
58. Id. at 484-85.
59. Id. at 487.
60. 451 U.S. at 486 n.9 (emphasis added). "To establish a waiver, it would thus be
a necessary fact that the accused, not the police reopened the dialogue."
61. See supra note 57. The "additional safeguard" of initiation of conversation is
triggered by the accused's invocation of his right to counsel.
62. 451 U.S. at 484-85. Relevent factors under the totality of circumstances are (1)
whether the accused was initially advised of his Miranda rights; (2) whether the accused
understood his rights; and (3) whether the accused's conduct in making a statement was
indicative of the accused's desire to forego his rights, i.e., by stating he did not need an
attorney.
63. This is the additional safeguard afforded once having invoked his right to coun-
sel. Unless the accused manifests a change of heart by initiating a conversation, he is
shielded from any methods used by police to elicit incriminating statements from him.
64. See supra note 60.
65. 451 U.S. at 484 (footnote omitted), "a valid waiver of that right cannot be
established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial inter-
rogation even if he has [again) been advised of his [Miranda] rights."
66. See supra note 63.
[Vol. 21
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mount.67 The Edwards Court, however, did not address this is-
sue,68 there being no statement by the defendant for the Court to
construe. Therefore, the Court did not provide guidelines to deter-
mine whether a statement made by an accused is within the Ed-
wards holding. Consequently, the determinative factor in the new
waiver standard was left undefined. The potential for misconstru-
ing the initiation of conversation requirement was predicted in the
concurring opinion of Justice Powell.69 To follow is an analysis of
Oregon v. Bradshaw70 in which this prediction proved true. There,
due to an overbroad interpretation of the initiation of conversation
requirement, the Supreme Court in fact emasculated the waiver
standard. Consequently, a waiver of the right to counsel during
custodial interrogation is now easily found and the accused is left
susceptible to the evils which the Constitution-as interpreted by
Miranda v. Arizona 71 and Edwards v. Arizona 72-sought to protect
against.
B. Oregon v. Bradshaw: Initiation of Conversation Defined
The defendant in Oregon v. Bradshaw was questioned at the po-
lice station regarding an automobile accident in which a young man
was killed. The defendant, Bradshaw, was advised of his Miranda
rights and subsequently arrested for furnishing liquor to the victim,
a minor.73 At the station, Bradshaw acknowledged furnishing the
victim Reynolds with liquor but denied any other involvement. A
67. Resolving this issue poses much difficulty, as is illustrated in Oregon v. Brad-
shaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983). An easy way to interpret initiation is by simply asking
who spoke first? This, however, contravenes the waiver standard in that all a suspect
need do to open the door to reinterrogation and a possible waiver of his right to counsel
is say anything, and say it before the police speak. Such a course of events cannot
amount to a knowing and intelligent waiver.
68. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. The facts of Edwards did not
require finding that Edwards had not initiated conversation. Edwards said nothing.
Therefore, he could not have waived his right to counsel. What is made clear by Ed-
wards is that the initiation of conversation issue is to be addressed at the outset of the
waiver determination. If no initiation is found, the inquiry is complete and the decision
is that no waiver has been made by an accused regardless of the voluntariness with
which an accused spoke or acted.
69. 451 U.S. at 488-89. Both Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist agreed that the
judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court must be reversed. However, Justice Powell
states, "I do not join the Court's opinion because I am not sure what it means. . . . In
view of the emphasis placed on 'initiation,'. . . I find the Court's opinion unclear." Id.
(Powell and Rehnquist, J.J., concurring) (citations omitted).
70. 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983).
71. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
72. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
73. 103 S. Ct. at 2833. At this point, the investigation was at its initial stages and
the death of Reynolds, the minor, was not yet characterized as a homicide. The pick-up
truck left the road, struck a tree, then an embankment and came to rest on its side in a
shallow creek. Reynolds died from traumatic injury, coupled with asphyxia by
drowning.
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police officer then told Bradshaw his version of the death, which
placed Bradshaw behind the wheel of the pick-up. Bradshaw again
denied any involvement and said, "I do want an attorney before it
goes very much farther. ' 74 The officer immediately terminated the
interrogation.
Shortly thereafter Bradshaw was driven approximately ten or fif-
teen miles to a jail. Just before, or during the trip, he inquired of a
police officer, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" 75 The
officer responded, "You do not have to talk to me. . . . You have
requested an attorney and I don't want you talking to me unless you
so desire because anything you say-because-since you have re-
quested an attorney, you know, it has to be at your own free will. ' ' 76
Bradshaw stated that he understood and a conversation ensued be-
tween Bradshaw and the officer concerning where Bradshaw would
be taken and the offense that he would be charged with. The officer
then suggested it may be beneficial to take a polygraph test and
Bradshaw agreed to submit to the examination. 77 The next day,
after another reading of his Miranda rights, Bradshaw took the lie
detector test. The examiner informed Bradshaw that the test indi-
cated he was lying.78 Bradshaw then admitted that he had been at
the wheel of the vehicle in which Reynolds was killed, and that he
had passed out due to intoxication. At his subsequent trial for first
degree manslaughter, driving while under the influence of intoxi-
cants, and driving with a revoked license, Bradshaw's post poly-
graph test statement was admitted into evidence. The state
appellate tribunal, however, held that the admission of the confes-
sion violated the Edwards standard and reversed Bradshaw's
conviction. 79
74. Id. This invocation of Bradshaw's right to counsel brings the doctrine into
play. A waiver of this right can only be found if (1) Bradshaw is found to have initiated
conversation, and ifhe did (2) under the totality of circumstances Bradshaw waived his
right to counsel. Most significant, however, is that under Edwards, unless Bradshaw
initiated conversation, the totality of circumstances inquiry is not relevant.
75. State v. Bradshaw, 54 Or. App. 949, 951, 636 P.2d 1011, 1011 (1981). Brad-
shaw asked the question only moments after he unequivocally invoked his right to coun-
sel. It is this question that the Supreme Court had to interpret in deciding whether
Bradshaw had initiated conversation with the police.
76. 103 S. Ct. at 2833.
77. Id. Bradshaw had not consulted with counsel at this point.
78. Note the similarity here to the psychological ploys described in Miranda which
are used to elicit incriminating statements from an accused. First, the officer suggests
that the accused take a lie detector test-for the accused's benefit-and then suggests
the accused is lying. Such a ploy is effective in that an accused can be convinced that
the police already know something and the accused cannot avoid confirming what the
police already know. As the lower court stated, "Though a conversation ensued, the
police officer clearly took advantage of the opening to reinterrogate defendant about his
culpability and suggest the lie detector test .... " 54 Or. App. at 953, 636 P.2d at
1013. See supra note 27.
79. Id. "We do not construe defendant's question about what was going to happen
[Vol. 21
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The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of
the Oregon court in a plurality opinion authored by Justice Rehn-
quist.80 Justice Rehnquist stated that the Oregon Court of Appeals
"misapprehended" the Edwards opinion as requiring an initiation of
conversation as the sole criterion on which to judge whether a
waiver of one's right to counsel, once invoked, had been made. 81
The opinion then reiterated that under Edwards v. Arizona 82 the
standard for a waiver of the right to counsel entailed a finding of
initiation of conversation, followed by an inquiry into the totality of
circumstances to determine whether the waiver was knowingly and
voluntarily made. 83 In applying the two step inquiry the Court held
that:
Although ambiguous, [Bradshaw's] question in this case as to
what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a
desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was
not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the
custodial relationship. It could reasonably have been interpreted
by the officer as relating generally to the investigation.
84
Finding no violation of the first step of the Edwards rule, the Court
held that under the totality of circumstances, Bradshaw had waived
to him ... [as] anything other than a normal reaction to being taken from the police
station and placed in a police car, obviously for transport to some destination." Thus,
the state court in Bradshaw interpreted defendant's statement as incident to being taken
into custody. Having so found, the court then concluded that the administration of the
lie detector test and subsequent interrogation of defendant were not at Bradshaw's sug-
gestion but at the authorities' request.
This analysis by the Oregon appellate court illustrates the proper focus in deciding
what constitutes initiation of conversation. The critical inquiry is with respect to the
substance of the statement by the accused. If it is merely a normal reaction to being
placed in custody, then the statement should not be construed as an initiation of conver-
sation and thereby a renunciation of an accused's desire to proceed only in the presence
of counsel.
80. Forming the majority were Justices Rehnquist, O'Conner, White, and Chief
Justice Burger. Dissenting were Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens.
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment.
81. 103 S. Ct. at 2834.
82. 451 U.S. 477.
83. 103 S. Ct. at 2834 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[In Edwards] we held that after the right to counsel had been asserted by an
accused, further interrogation of the accused should not take place "unless the
accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations
with the police." . . . But even if a conversation taking place after the ac-
cused, has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel"
where reinterrogation follows, the burden remains on the prosecution to prove
that the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so
under the totality of circumstances.
However, the confusion does not lie in the interpretation of Edwards. Edwards is poten-
tially a two prong test. The second prong, the inquiry into the totality of circumstances,
is relevant only if it is found that the suspect initiated conversation with police. The
Oregon state tribunal, having found that Bradshaw had not initiated conversation with
police properly did not address the second prong of the Edwards test for a waiver.
84. Id. at 2835.
1985]
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his right to counsel asserted only moments before he inquired of the
police officer, "Well, what is going to happen to me now."'8 5 The
United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Bradshaw 8 6 attempted to
define the term initiation of conversation by an accused in cus-
tody.8 7 However, while the Court in Bradshaw enunciated a seem-
ingly specific standard-that a statement by an accused must evince
a desire for a more generalized discussion about the investigation-
its application served only to further obfuscate the inquiry.
C. Initiation of Conversation Defined: Suspect's Shield
Weakened
Once a suspect invokes his right to counsel while in police cus-
tody, all interrogation must cease.88 At this point, the suspect has
excercised his right to cut off questioning until his attorney is pres-
ent in order to prevent a coerced incriminating statement without
the benefit of legal counsel.89 Both the Edwards90 and Bradshaw91
decisions make clear that once the accused invokes his right to
counsel, a subsequent waiver of that right may be found only if the
accused initiates conversation with the police.92
Under Bradshaw, an accused initiates conversation if his state-
ment "evince[s] a willingness and a desire for a more generalized
discussion about the investigation. ' 93 However, a finding of initia-
tion of conversation by itself does not constitute a waiver.94 The
government must then demonstrate that the totality of circum-
stances indicate a knowing, intelligent and voluntary relinquish-
ment of the fifth amendment right to counsel. 95 Crucial to the
defendant's position is, that once he initiates conversation with the
85. Id. at 2834. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the state court's finding on
initiation of conversation. Having found that Bradshaw did initiate conversation with
police, the court then addressed the totality of circumstances issue and concluded that
Bradshaw waived his right to counsel. The Oregon appellate court applied the Ed-
ward's test consistently with the Supreme Court's application of the Edwards test in the
Bradshaw decision. The only difference is that the Oregon Court answered the initia-
tion of conversation issue in the negative which under Edwards ends the waiver inquiry.
The Supreme Court answered the initiation of conversation issue in the affirmative,
thereby making an inquiry into the totality of circumstances proper.
86. 103 S. Ct. 2830.
87. Id. at 2835.
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.
89. Id.
90. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
91. 103 S. Ct. 2830.
92. 451 U.S. at 486 n.9.
93. 103 S. Ct. at 2835.
94. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). See in accord United States v. Mont-
gomery, 714 F.2d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Gazzara, 587 F. Supp. 311
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Renda, 567 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1983).
95. 103 S. Ct. at 2834.
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police, the police may then begin reinterrogation. At this point, the
authorities may use their questioning expertise to elicit incriminat-
ing statements from the accused. 96 Then under the totality of cir-
cumstances doctrine, if the suspect's statements were voluntary and
the suspect was legally competent to understand his acts, he will be
held to have waived his right to counsel, and all statements made
while in custody would be admissable at trial. The initiation of con-
versation question, therefore, has a determinative and potentially
devastating effect on the waiver issue. Thus, the inquiry should fo-
cus acutely on what in fact the accused meant by his statement in
order to assure that a knowing and intelligent waiver was made.97
In attempting to distinguish between those statements that should
fall within the category of initiation and those that should not, a
brief analysis of how lower courts have dealt with the issue prior to
the Bradshaw decision is helpful.98
In McCree v. Housewright,99 the defendant McCree was ar-
rested' O° and advised of his rights as required by Miranda v. Ari-
zona. 0 1 The defendant was questioned until he indicated his desire
to meet with an attorney, at which point the conversation ceased.
McCree was then returned to his cell. Some time later, McCree
knocked on his cell door and said he wanted to make a statement to
96. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
97. The standard for waiving a constitutional right is stricter with regard to the
right to counsel than in other instances. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
237 (1973) the Court stated, "Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing
and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution
guarantees .... " The Court further explained:
A strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaranteed to a
criminal defendant to insure that he will be accorded the greatest possible
opportunity to utilize every facet of the constitutional model of a fair criminal
trial. Any trial conducted in derogation of that model leaves open the possi-
bility that the trial reached an unfair result precisely because all the protec-
tions specified in the Constitution were not provided. A prime example is the
right to counsel. For without that right, a wholly innocent accused faces the
real and substantial danger that simply because of his lack of legal expertise he
may be convicted.
412 U.S. at 241.
98. In addition to the cases cited below see State v. Breeze, 66 Hawaii 163, 657
P.2d 1044 (1983) (defendant requested that the detective return to his cell where de-
fendant expressed his desire to make a statement); Payne v. State, 424 So. 2d 722 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1982) (defendant requested a meeting with police at which statements were
made); Pittman v. State, 210 Neb. 117, 313 N.W.2d 252 (1981) (defendant initiated
further conversation by stating that he was being "railroaded" by his co-defendants);
State v. Willie, 410 So. 2d 1019 (La. 1982) (defendant appeared before a federal magis-
trate and voluntarily signaled his willingness to discuss his acts with law enforcement
officers). See also Wyrick v. Fields, 103 S. Ct. 394 (1982) (per curiam).
99. 689 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1982).
100. McCree was arrested for involvement in the robbery and murder of the owner
and operator of a gift shop in Camden, Arkansas.
101. 384 U.S. 436.
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the police. 10 2 The defendant was again Mirandized and police were
diligent in ascertaining whether he understood his fights and
whether he still desired to make a statement in the absence of coun-
sel. 103 The court cited Edwards as imposing a two prong test °4 and
noted "[tihe crucial inquiry. . . is whether petitioner or the police
initiated the communication which led to his incriminating state-
ment." 10 5 The court held that the defendant, by unequivocally stat-
ing he had something to say to the police, initiated the conversation
during which he incriminated himself.10 6
Similarly, in United States v. Thierman,0 7 the defendant was ar-
rested, 108 read his Miranda rights, and interrogated until he in-
voked his right to counsel.109 The questioning then ceased. Upon
overhearing that his family and girlfriend would have to be ques-
tioned, Thierman requested the return of the officer who had ini-
tially interrogated him.110 After a brief discussion involving the
investigation, the defendant stated that although his lawyer would
"kill him" he would cooperate with the police in order to avoid any
involvement of his girlfriend and family. 11' The court held that
Thierman had invoked his right to counsel but had subsequently
initiated conversation within the meaning of Edwards when he re-
quested the return of the detective in order to make a statement. 112
In United States v. Gordon,113 the defendant, Gordon, was ar-
rested for mail fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property,
and making false statements to a bank.1 4 Upon arrest, Gordon was
102. 689 F.2d at 799.
103. Id. at 800. Before allowing McCree to make a statement the detectives read
him his rights, one by one, asked him if he understood each one, reminded him of his
prior request for counsel and finally allowed McCree to make a statement. Note that
the re-Mirandizing of an accused after he intiates conversation is relevant to the totality
of circumstances, the second step of the Edwards standard of waiver.
104. Id. at 802 n.8. The Court emphasized that the waiver inquiry entails first,
whether the defendant initiated conversation and second, whether defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his fifth amendment right to counsel.
105. Id. at 802.
106. Id. The court then held that under the totality of circumstances an intelligent
waiver was made.
107. 678 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1982).
108. Thierman was arrested for credit card fraud and four post office burglaries.
His arrest was made while police were on their way to his house to execute a search
warrant.
109. Id. at 1332.
110. The events described took place in Thierman's apartment. Detective Barkman
questioned Thierman until he invoked his right to counsel, at which time Barkman left.
Thereafter Thierman overheard one officer speaking with another indicating that Bark-
man was going to question his girlfriend about the stolen money orders. At this point,
Thierman intervened and requested Barkman's return.
111. Id. at 1333.
112. Id. at 1334.
113. 655 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1981).
114. Id. at 480.
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advised of his Miranda rights. 115 After an unsuccessful attempt to
reach his attorney, Gordon requested that he be permitted to re-
read the Advice of Rights form." 6 After re-reading his rights, the
defendant stated that he wished to provide information about
"somebody else that should be arrested for the same thing."' 1 7 The
court held that by doing so, Gordon had initiated conversation with
the police." 8 The court further concluded that under the totality of
circumstances, Gordon had in fact waived his fifth amendment
right to counsel. 19
In all of the cases cited above, the statements made by the defen-
dants, subsequent to an invocation of their right to counsel, evinced
a desire to reveal something they had not revealed during initial
questioning, thus unambiguously manifesting a desire to discuss
their predicament. Furthermore, this finding was reached by a
careful analysis of the circumstances existing at the time the state-
ment was made in order to determine What in fact the accused
meant by his statement. 120
A statement by an accused should be strictly scrutinized in order
to determine whether he has knowingly decided to discuss his pre-
dicament with the police in the absence of counsel. If not, the sus-
pect should be considered "legally silent."' 2' Moreover, due to the
strict standard for waiving a constitutional right and the inherently
115. 384 U.S. 436.
116. 655 F.2d at 482. In addition to informing an arrestee of his Miranda rights,
officers often carry such a form to allow the accused to read over his Miranda rights.
Such a procedure is helpful in ensuring that a suspect understands his rights upon
arrest.
117. Id. at 485.
118. Id. (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477).
119. Id. at 485-86. "We are satisfied that Gordon initiated such communication and
that the '"particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including back-
ground, experience and conduct of the accused"',... support the district court's find-
ing that [Gordon knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel]." Id. at 485
(citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484; quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938)).
120. In McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 1982) the court consid-
ered the fact that beginning in the morning of the day in question, "petitioner began
knocking on the cell door stating that he had something he wanted to tell." McCree
made his statement several hours later. Furthermore, the measures taken by the police
in making sure that McCree still desired to make a statement, subsequent to his initia-
tion of conversation, were relevant. In State v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478, 486 (2d Cir.
1981) the court notes that "Gordon's cautious behavior before volunteering his state-
ment. . . persuades us that this decision to proceed without counsel was carefully con-
sidered .... " In United States v. Thierman, 678 F.2d 1331, 1333 (9th Cir. 1982) the
court notes that Thierman was concerned from the outset of the interrogation about his
girlfriend being questioned and acted on his own volition when he requested that the
detective return.
121. 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983). The term is used by the author to denote the legal
conclusion which should follow from statements that cannot be fairly interpreted as a
desire to talk in the absence of counsel. Such statements should be treated as if never
made.
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determinative nature of the right to counsel, an ambiguous state-
ment should be interpreted in the defendant's favor as "legal
silence".
The Supreme Court in Oregon v. Bradshaw,122 however, inter-
preted Bradshaw's ambiguous statement to police as an initiation of
conversation and ultimately found that Bradshaw had waived his
right to counsel.123 Upon being arrested for furnishing liquor to a
minor, Bradshaw was transported in a police car to a jail ten to
fifteen miles away. It was during this trip that Bradshaw asked,
"Well, what is going to happen to me now?" 124 The Supreme Court
held that "[a]lthough ambiguous, the respondent's question in this
case . . . evinced a willingness and a desire for generalized discus-
sion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry
arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship. It could
reasonably have been interpreted by the officer as relating generally
to the investigation."1 25 The analysis used by the Court is contrary
to that set forth in Edwards26 and represents a radical departure
from the strict standard for a waiver of the fifth amendment right to
counsel.' 27 A more comprehensive inquiry into the context in
which Bradshaw asked, "Well, what is going to happen to me
now?" illustrates that it should have been interpreted as merely inci-
dental to the custodial setting and not as a desire to talk about the
investigation.
As the Oregon state court held, a fair interpretation of this state-
ment is that it was a normal response to Bradshaw's custodial sur-
roundings. 28 His question, on its face, does not carry with it any
indicia of a willingness to reveal anything more about the investiga-
tion. 129 Support for this interpretation is found in the conversation
that followed between the police officer and Bradshaw. The conver-
sation was concerned with respondent's destination and the offense
with which he would be charged.' 30 However, even assuming the
122. 103 S. Ct. 2830.
123. Id. at 2835.
124. Id. at 2833.
125. Id. at 2835.
126. 451 U.S. 477.
127. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
128. State v. Bradshaw, 54 Or. App. 949, 953, 636 P.2d 1011, 1013 (1981). "We do
not construe defendant's question about what was going to happen to him [as] anything
other than a normal reaction to being taken from the police station and placed in a
police car, obviously for transport to some destination."
129. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. While the defendants in all of these
cases involved the defendants' attempt to reveal something they had not talked about
during the intial questioning, Bradshaw did nothing of the sort. He asked a question
relating to his destination of which he had no knowledge and no choice. "The very
essence of custody is the loss of control over one's freedom of movement." Oregon v.
Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. at 2840 (Marshall, J., dissenting.)
130. 103 S. Ct. at 2833.
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question is ambiguous, due to the importance of the right to counsel
and the strict standard for waiver historically adhered to by the
Court, the ambiguity should be construed in the defendant's favor,
as legal silence.13' Second, in construing Bradshaw's statement, the
Court focused on the officer's initial response to it and equated this
response to a reminder to Bradshaw of his Miranda rights. 132 This
focus is also contrary to that mandated in Edwards v. Arizona.133
The Edwards Court specifically held that the number of times the
Miranda warnings are furnished to an accused-while relevant to
the totality of circumstances test-is insignificant absent a finding
of initiation of conversation. 134 Furthermore, in considering the of-
ficer's response, the Court placed emphasis of the officer's interpre-
tation of the question. 135 In scrutinizing a statement made by an
accused, the inquiry should not focus on the police officer's inter-
pretation of the statement, but on the accused's subjective intent. 136
Another salient factor deserving more weight than that given by the
Court in Bradshaw is the fact that respondent had invoked his right
to counsel only moments before asking his question.13 7 This makes
it difficult to believe that Bradshaw had so quickly changed his
mind, deciding instead to forego his right to have counsel present.
As the above analysis illustrates Bradshaw, by asking, "Well,
what is going to happen to me now?" was merely inquiring into
where the officers were taking him. At this point, further question-
ing was a violation of Bradshaw's fifth amendment privilege against
self incrimination as construed by the United States Supreme Court
in Miranda v. Arizona.138 "If the individual states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is pres-
ent." 139 The suggestion that Bradshaw take a polygraph test and
the fact that the subsequent interchanges were police-initiated
131. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
132. Id. at 2835.
133. 451 U.S. 477.
134. Id. at 484.
135. The Court in Bradshaw stated: "It could reasonably have been interpreted by
the officer as relating generally to the investigation. That the police officer so under-
stood it is apparent. . . ." 103 S. Ct. at 2835.
136. In United States. v. Montgomery, 714 F.2d 201 (Ist Cir. 1983), the court inter-
preted the question "Am I being charged with each gun?" as a "natural, if not inevita-
ble, query which would occur to one in his situation . . . ." Note the similarity
between the question in Montgomery and Bradshaw's question "Well, what is going to
happen to me now?" These questions are natural responses to being placed in custody
and should not be interpreted as a desire to talk with the police in the absence of an
attorney only a short time after a suspect has invoked his right to counsel. Considering
the frequency with which these questions are asked, the Bradshaw decision is a danger-
ous precedent that should be viewed in the future with much skepticism by the courts.
137. State v. Bradshaw, 54 Or. App. at 949, 636 P.2d at 1011.
138. 384 U.S. 436.
139. Id. at 474.
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should have precluded a finding that Bradshaw waived his previ-
ously invoked right to counsel. 14 To allow reinterrogation based
on this type of statement drastically undermines the safeguards that
both Miranda'41 and Edwards 42 carefully erected around the right
to counsel in the custodial arrest setting.
The potential for future injustice created by the holding in Ore-
gon v. Bradshaw is alarming. 43 As a result of the decision, the
140. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484. As the Court stated in Edwards, the rule
was designed to "protect an accused from any interrogation subsequent to an invocation
of the right to counsel at the insistence of the authorities and not the accused." See
United States v. Renda, 567 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1983), "The initiation must be of a
nature that indicates the accused's desire to engage in a colloquy with government per-
sonnel concerning his criminal activity." Id. at 488; see also United States v. Montgom-
ery, 714 F.2d 201 (lst Cir. 1983); United States v. Gazzara, 587 F. Supp. 311 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
141. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
142. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
143. In United States v. Montgomery, 714 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1983) the defendant
was arrested for possession of firearms, he was read his Miranda rights and the follow-
ing conversation ensued:
Montgomery: Am I being charged with each gun?
Agent Sherman: You will probably be charged with two counts.
Montgomery: Did all of the guns fire?
Agent Sherman: Yes. Why do you want to know?
Montgomery: The sawed-off was in pieces.
Agent Sherman: That is right, but it only took a minute to put together.
Montgomery: Ya, but it was missing a spring.
Agent Sherman: Well the State Police test fired the gun and it worked. Did
you have any problem firing the gun?
Montgomery: I could not get it to work.
Id. at 202.
The court held that the question "Am I being charged with each gun?" did not con-
stitute initiation of conversation and then discussed the consequences of interpreting
initiation of conversation too loosely. "If such were to be held an 'open Sesame,' the
opportunities for eviscerating all protective discipline and restraint in custodial interro-
gation would be immense." Id. at 204. The court then used the conversation above to
illustrate how law enforcement can take one "simple, not-guilt-suggestive question" and
use it "as a license to launch a fishing expedition." Id. at 205. The court held that
Montgomery's first question "was a natural, if not inevitable, query which would occur
to one in his situation," Id. at 204, or as the Supreme Court in Bradshaw put it "relating
to routine incidents of the custodial relationship". Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. at
2835. The answer given by the officer was unresponsive. 714 F.2d at 204. Either be-
cause of this unresponsiveness or because appellant knew enough about the law to know
that violation of the firearms law involved the possession of a firearm that was operable,
he asked his second question. Id. The officer responded with a question and the con-
versation continued. Montgomery's third and fourth statements were both relevant to
prove possession. The officer's last question, "'Did you have any problems firing the
gun?' was a question which, whether answered 'yes' or 'no,' would entrap appellant into
incriminating himself most directly." Id. The analysis in Montgomery illustrates the
need to closely scrutinize an accused's statement after the suspect invokes his right to
counsel. A suspect invokes his right to counsel to avoid any further interchanges with
the police regarding his predicament, during which he may incriminate himself. A
statement by a suspect in custody must show a change of mind without coercion or
probing by officers in order to constitute "initiation" within the meaning of Edwards,
451 U.S. 477. Otherwise the protections announced in Miranda and Edwards are dan-
gerously emasculated. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124 (5th
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question of what statements will satisfy the initiation requirement
has been confused. Lower courts are left with little guidance. On
the one hand, it is the duty of all courts to uphold the strict stan-
dard for a waiver of a constitutional right. 44 Yet, under Bradshaw,
the first and indispensable element for a valid finding of a waiver is
easily found. With the initiation of conversation requirement satis-
fied easily, an accused, upon making practically any statement to
police, opens the door to reinterrogation after having invoked his
right to counsel 145 and consequently a waiver of the right to the
presence of counsel during these interchanges is more easily
found. 146
Justice Marshall, in dissent, interprets Edwards as requiring not
only that an accused initiate further communication, but also that
the communication be about "the subject matter of the criminal in-
vestigation."' 47 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, re-
quires only that the accused "[evince] a willingness and a desire for
a generalized discussion about the investigation."1 48 Conceding for
the moment that Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of Edwards is
correct, its application in Bradshaw is too broad.' 49 If Bradshaw's
statement satisfies the test of initiation, as the Court holds it does,
then arguably any statement will satisfy the test and the inquiry as
to the initiation is merely "who spoke first?"'150
Cir. 1984) provides a possible solution. The court in Cherry stated that an ambiguous
statement by an accused should be followed with questions to clarify the suspect's intent
as to whether the statement is in fact an assertion to speak with the authorities in the
absence of counsel. Id. at 1130.
144. See supra note 97.
145. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474, the Court stated "if the individual
states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is pres-
ent." As a result of Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830, this right to cut off question-
ing is easily forfeited by an accused who has expressly requested the presence of counsel.
146. Pursuant to Oregon v. Bradshaw, it is my contention that an accused can now
waive the fifth amendment right to counsel without being aware that he is doing so.
This is contrary to the constitutional standard of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver and must be reviewed with skepticism.
147. 103 S. Ct. at 2839 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
148. Id. at 2835.
149. Such concession is justifiably made. Although Justice Marshall would require
a more specific statement by a suspect indicating his desire to discuss the investigation,
both Justice Marshall and Justice Rehnquist would seemingly agree that whatever the
correct standard may be, the statement must hold some indicia of a desire to discuss the
investigation and not, for example, where the police may be taking a suspect.
150. See United States v. Morrow, 731 F.2d 233 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
2689 (1984) "Particularly since the Supreme Court has recently recognized that a ques-
tion as vague as, 'Well, what is going to happen to me now?' may permit a finding that
an arrestee 'initiated' conversation, we have little difficulty in holding that, by his af-
firmatively loquacious bearing, Morrow likewise initiated conversation with Alsbrooks,
and thereafter waived his right to silence." Id. at 237. See also United States v.
Kroesser, 731 F.2d 1509, 1520 (11th Cir. 1984).
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CONCLUSION
In Edwards v. Arizona,'51 the United States Supreme Court re-
cognized that once an accused has invoked his right to counsel, "ad-
ditional safeguards" are necessary to effectively preserve this
right.' 52 The rule promulgated in Edwards was that once an ac-
cused invokes his right to counsel upon being taken into custody, a
subsequent waiver of that right cannot be found unless the accused
reopens dialogue with the authorities.' 53 However, in Edwards the
Court offered no specific guidelines as to what constitutes initiation
of conversation.
In Oregon v. Bradshaw,'54 the Court had an opportunity to clar-
ify the definition of initiation of conversation. The result, however,
is an overinclusive definition of initiation of conversation in which
virtually any statement made by an accused in custody is likely to
rise to the level of initiation of conversation.
A statement by an accused cannot reasonably qualify as an initia-
tion of conversation within the meaning of Edwards v. Arizona un-
less it can be clearly said to invite the officers to discuss the
investigation. Otherwise, the mandate that a waiver be a knowing
and intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege is se-
verely emasculated. Unless the statement can be fairly interpreted
as a desire to forego the presence of counsel, the suspect should be
considered legally silent. Moreover, due to the severe consequences
that may ensue, an ambiguous statement should be interpreted in
the defendant's favor.' 55 Indeed, a much stricter scrutiny of an ac-
151. 451 U.S. 477.
152. Id. at 484.
153. Id.
154. 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983).
155. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. The New York Court of Appeals, in
recognizing the severe consequences to an accused who has waived his right to counsel,
has held that an accused who has invoked his right to counsel cannot waive this right in
the absence of counsel. In affording to a suspect the protection of the "indelible" right
to counsel rule, the court of appeals in Cunningham expressed the view that Miranda
warnings alone cannot suffice to ensure that an accused "will not waive an important
constitutional right out of ignorance, confusion or fear." The indelible rule of New
York "breathes life into the requirement that a waiver of a constitutional right must be
competent, intelligent and voluntary." People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 208, 400
N.E.2d 360, 363, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (1980). See also People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d
479, 484, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (1976).
The same court in People v. Settles stated, "Absent the advice of an attorney, the
average person, unschooled in legal intricacies, might very well unwittingly surrender
this right when confronted with the coercive power of the State and its agents." 46
N.Y.2d 154, 161, 385 N.E.2d 612, 615, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878 (1978).
The New York Court of Appeals, in creating the "indelible rule" implies that a vol-
untary, intelligent and intentional waiver cannot exist unless counsel is present to bring
home to an accused the ramifications of being subject to police custody without the
assistance of counsel. Although it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will adopt this
view as a matter of federal law, this indelible rule, if anything, manifests the need to
[Vol. 21
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cused's statement than that employed in the Bradshaw decision is
necessary if the standard of proof for a finding of a waiver of the
right to counsel is to be upheld.
James Kousouros
view alleged waivers with much skepticism and to focus the inquiry on whether a delib-
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